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Abstract: Variation in executions and abolition of the death penalty by year and state in 
Australia was used to examine the deterrent effect of the death penalty on homicides. A 
dataset covering 1910-2010 was collected comprising homicide rates and controls for 
demographic and criminal justice features. Using OLS, there was no evidence that executions 
have a deterrent effect. There is some evidence of a deterrent effect of capital punishment 
laws, but the effect is no longer significant once demographic and criminal justice variables 
were added to the model. However, when using exogenous variation in party-political 
representation to address endogeneity issues, no evidence of a deterrent effect of capital 
punishment was found.   
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In Australia, the last judicial hanging took place just over fifty years ago. Although capital 
punishment has receded into Australia’s past, we can examine history to help answer a 
question that is still being asked today: does the death penalty deter potential murderers? 
Although some potential murderers might prefer death to a long prison sentence, for most 
people the existence of capital punishment raises the price of murder. On the other hand, 
perhaps people kill precisely because they are not acting rationally; and, instead, they 
surrender to violent impulses. Because the death penalty was used and abolished at different 
times in different Australian states, the case of Australian capital punishment is pertinent to 
today’s debate about the death penalty.  
For this study, a dataset covering 1910-2010 was collected comprising homicide rates 
and controls for demographic and criminal justice features. The identification strategy of this 
study was to exploit year- and state-variation in executions and abolition of the death penalty 
to examine the deterrent effect of the death penalty on homicides.  
This study makes a number of contributions to the literature. This study is a rare 
analysis of non-American data. Nearly all research on the deterrent effect of the death penalty 
has been about the United States.  That most studies have been American is not necessarily a 
bad thing, but examining other countries allows one to address issues that cannot be 
addressed in the American context.  
First, executions were relatively more frequent in Australia. In the USA, since the 
reintroduction of the death penalty in the late 1970s, there has been about one execution for 
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every 500 homicides.1 In Australia, when the death penalty was used, there was about one 
execution per 100 homicides.  
Second, because of the considerable variation in the delay between convictions and 
executions in the US, there has been much debate in the literature about the correct lag 
lengths to include in econometric models. In the USA since the 1970s, prisoners have waited 
over eleven years, on average (with standard deviation of around five years), between trial 
and execution.2 The situation in Australia was more straightforward. There was a much more 
immediate threat of being executed in Australia than is the case in the USA. And there was 
much less variation in how long prisoners would spend on death row. In Australia, about half 
of those executed were hanged during the same calendar year as the crime they were 
convicted of.3 Nearly all of the remaining convicts were executed during the following year.  
Third, the capital and non-capital sanction regimes were relatively homogenous 
across Australian states. The US Academy of Science has criticised American studies 
because they do not adequately account for the different systems of sanctions that exist in 
different US states (National Research Council, 2012). Certain murders are punishable by the 
death penalty in some US states whereas not in other states because different criteria are used 
to define capital murders; for example, whether the victim was a child, the motive of the 
murderer, and whether the victim was a police officer. However, in Australia, the definition 
of capital murder was much more homogenous across states. Furthermore, the US Academy 
had a concern that the non-capital sanctions regime might be correlated with retention of the 
death penalty. For example, US states that execute prisoners might also impose lengthier 
                                                          
1 Stevenson, Betsy & Wolfers, Justin. “The Death Penalty Debate Represents a Market Failure.” Bloomberg 
June 11 2012. 
2 Death Penalty Information Centre https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/files/deathpenaltystats.xls accessed 
December 5th 2017 
3 http://www.capitalpunishmentuk.org/aus1900.html accessed December 5th 2017 
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sentences on other offenders. Across Australian states, non-capital sanctions were very 
similar regardless of the status of the death penalty. 
Fourth, a central argument of this paper’s identification strategy is that abolition of the 
death penalty in Australia would have happened sooner if not for how long it took for each 
state’s upper house of parliament to be reformed. Bills to abolish the death penalty needed to 
pass both houses of each state’s parliament. The electoral systems, or lack thereof, for upper 
houses disadvantaged those seeking to abolish the death penalty. IV estimation that uses this 
exogenous variation in the abolition of the death penalty indicates that there was no causal of 
effect of capital punishment on homicide. 
  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
MacDonald (1910, 93), one of the first empirical analysis of the death penalty, concluded that 
“whether the death penalty lessens crime (especially murder) or not, cannot as yet be 
demonstrated by statistics”. Over one hundred years later, the National Academies of 
Science, Engineering and Medicine came to a similar conclusion (National Research Council, 
2012). 
 In the previous decade, a number of studies that used US panel data to examine the 
deterrent effect of capital punishment were published. Mocan and Gittings (2003) found a 
significant deterrent effect of executions and existence of death penalty laws although the 
level of statistical significance is at either the 5% level or the 10% level depending on how 
variables are included in their estimated models.  Zimmerman (2004) found a significant 
deterrent effect of executions when using Two-Stage Least Squares. Dezhbakhsh, Rubin and 
Shepherd (2003) found a that executions had a large and statistically significant deterrent 
effect.   
5 
 
These studies were criticised by Donohue and Wolfers (2005 & 2009) who reanalysed 
the previous researchers’ data, and showed that the estimated effect of the death penalty 
varied significantly when changes were made to the econometric models. The authors of the 
original studies wrote replies: Zimmermann (2009); Mocan and Gittings (2010); Dezhbakhsh 
and Rubin (2011). The researchers debated issues such as the methods for constructing 
standard errors to address correlation within clusters; the construction of the deterrent 
variable; the validity of instrumental variables; the inclusion of influential outliers in the 
analysis; the distinction and coding of de jure versus de facto abolition; coding errors; and the 
sensitivity of results due to varying the lag lengths of different variables.  
The National Research Council (2012), while noting the discrepancies in findings 
between the different studies, critiqued the literature from a different angle. The NRC 
emphasised that the existing studies did not account for the variation of non-capital sanction 
regimes nor did they account for how criminals perceive risks. In the Results Section of this 
paper, the issue of non-capital sanctions will be discussed.  
 The question of how criminals perceive apprehension and punishment is difficult to 
answer. Are criminals’ perceptions of the risk of apprehension and punishment the same as 
the objective probability of being caught and punished? Given a lack of data, all that can be 
said is that, in Australia, while potential murderers might not have known the exact 
probability of being caught, convicted and executed, it is likely that they knew execution was 
at least a possibility if they committed murder. Although executions in Australia during the 
20th century were carried out in prisons and not in public, they were reported on by 
newspapers.  
Another notable aspect of the literature on the death penalty, is that very few studies 
in this field examined non-American data. An example is Zimring, Fagan, and Johnson 
(2010) who compared Singapore and Hong Kong. In many ways, as the authors demonstrate, 
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these two places are very similar. However, the authorities in Singapore suddenly increased 
the number of executions in the early 1990s and then gradually decreased the number of 
execution; while in Hong Kong nobody was executed, and the death penalty was abolished in 
1993. Yet both places have had very similar levels and trends of homicide rates over the last 
half century or so.  
The other non-American studies published in the economics literature have been 
analyses of national time series. Avio (1979) did not find a statistically significant effect of 
executions on murders when examining a national time series for Canada covering 1926-
1960. However, Layson (1983) found a significant deterrent effect of executions using data 
from 1927-1977. Donohue and Wolfers (2005) show that the homicide rates in Canada and 
the United States, although differing in their level, followed a very similar trend since the 
1950s despite having different capital punishment regimes.  
Wolpin (1978) found a statistically significant effect of executions on homicide using 
aggregate data from England and Wales from 1929 to 1968. However, given that the time-
series covered a single jurisdiction, the estimated effect of executions could have been due to 
unobserved factors that varied over time.  
 
CONTEXT  
Australia is a rare example of a country where the death penalty was used and abolished in 
different places in different years. Initially, when Australia was founded, all six of its states 
regularly hanged convicts; but, over the course of the twentieth century, all states gradually 
stopped executing prisoners. Eventually, the death penalty was abolished in all states. Table 1 
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shows the date of the last execution in each state and the date that the death penalty was 
abolished for murder. From 1910 to 1967, 71 people were hanged in Australia.4  
Examining Table 1, one can see that the average homicide rate is quite similar when 
comparing states. Western Australia had the lowest average annual homicide rate, but it had 
the most hangings despite being a smaller state, and it also was the last state to abolish 
hanging. On the other hand, Queensland was the first state to abolish the death penalty, and it 
had the fewest executions during the twentieth century. Yet, Queensland’s average annual 
homicide rate was the second lowest over the hundred-year period covered by the data. New 
South Wales and Victoria are the two most populous states. The two states had very similar 
homicide rates despite Victoria’s last execution taking place nearly thirty years after New 
South Wales’s and Victoria abolishing the death penalty about twenty years later than New 
South Wales.  
 Figures 1a to 1f show the homicide rate plotted for each year in each state. Executions 
are indicated by the light grey vertical lines, and the dates of abolition are shown by the 
orange vertical lines. In New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia and Tasmania, there 
were high homicide rates at the start of the series, a decline during the 1930s and 1940s, 
followed by a rise in the 1950s that continued until the 1990s. In Queensland, the homicide 
rate fluctuated with no trend until after the Second World War when there was an upward 
trend that continued until the 1990s. In Western Australia, the homicide rate was highly 
variable before the Second World War. Then there was a slight upward trend that lasted until 
the 1990s.  
                                                          
4 The US military executed one of their own personnel on Australian soil during 1943, but 




Based on the plots in Figure 1a-1f, it does not seem that use of the death penalty had 
any effect on the homicide rate. There were hangings in all states except Queensland during 
the 1930s. During that time, the homicide rate declined in most states. After the Second 
World War, homicide rates rose for the next few decades in all states. By that time, New 
South Wales and Queensland had already abolished the death penalty; Tasmania and Victoria 
executed people very rarely but still had the death penalty in law; and South Australia and 
Western Australia continued to execute until the mid-1960s and did not abolish the death 
penalty until the 1970s and 1980s. 
 However, an analysis of homicide rates just before and after the abolition of the death 
penalty suggests that homicide rates may have risen in  New South Wales, South Australia, 
Western Australia and Tasmania. In Queensland and Victoria, the annual homicide rate five 
years after abolition was lower than it had been during the previous five years. In the other 
states, homicide rates rose after abolition.  
A difference-in-difference analysis shows that homicide rates rose in states when they 
abolished the death penalty by more than the change in homicide rates in the states that 
retained the death penalty, except in the case of Victoria. However, other variables might 
have explain the correlation.   
 
Australian Capital Territory and the Northern Territory 
In this analysis, the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) and the Northern Territory 
(NT) were excluded. There were no executions in the ACT and just five in the NT. Both 
territories abolished the death penalty in 1973. 
The ACT and NT are excluded from the analysis for a number of reasons. First, these 
territories have much smaller populations than the rest of Australia (less so for the ACT in 
recent years). Currently the ACT and NT make up about 5% and 3% of the Australian 
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population; but for much of the period covered by the historical time series, these territories 
had less than 2% of the Australian population. Second, the demographic characteristics of 
these territories are much different from the rest of Australia. The ACT’s population is, by 
design, entirely urbanised and disproportionally comprises public sector workers. The 
Northern Territory’s population is far more rural than the rest of Australia.  
Third, some of the variables used in this analysis were either not recorded for the 
Territories or are not applicable. For example, it is difficult to ascertain the prison population 
of the ACT given that convicts from the ACT are usually sent to prisons in New South 
Wales. Last, as will be discussed below, the Indigenous population was not measured 
accurately for most of Australia’s history, and this measurement problem will particularly 
affect data relating to the Northern Territory where Indigenous Australians make up a much 
larger share of the population than in the rest of Australia. 
 
METHOD & DATA  
The definition and source of each variable used in the analysis is shown in Table 2.  The 
dependent variable in these regressions is the homicide rate per 100,000 in a state in a given 
year.5 Homicide is defined by the International Classification of Deaths as “injuries inflicted 
by another person with intent to injure or kill, by any means”. The definition excludes 
suicides, war, executions, and motor vehicle accidents.  
The death penalty indicator variables are whether there were any executions during 
the previous year and whether the death penalty had been abolished in a given state and year.  
Ehrlich’s pioneering study of 1975 (Ehrlich, 1975) specified that homicide rates were 
a function of arrest rates for murder, the probability of a death sentence given conviction for 
                                                          
5 Results robust to including/excluding homicides due to Port Arthur Massacre of 1996 in Tasmania where 35 
people were killed by a lone gunman. 
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murder, and the probability of being executed conditional on being given a death sentence.  
These ratios have been used in Mocan and Gittings (2003) and Zimmerman (2004). 
It was not possible to construct these ratios for each Australian state in each year. In 
the statistical yearbooks of each state, different systems for recording crime and the outcomes 
of the criminal trials have been used. In most states, arrest data was not collected until after 
the Second World War. While the number of murder convictions was usually recorded, the 
number of acquittals was usually not recoded. Also, after the 1970s, the data were only 
recorded sporadically in the state yearbooks.  
In any case, the deterrence ratios have been criticised by Donohue and Wolfers (2006 
and 2009). For example, arrest rates do not adequately summarize murders where there are 
multiple victims or perpetrators or where the perpetrator commits suicide. A murder incident 
clearance rate would be a better summary of the effectiveness of police in solving crimes. 
Unfortunately, it was not possible to construct crime clearance rates using the historical data.  
The share of young males in the state population was included in the model because 
young men are more likely to commit violent crime. Figure 2a shows the male share of the 
population in each state as estimated by the Australian Bureau of Statistics. At the start of the 
twentieth century, Western Australia and Queensland had a higher percentage of young men, 
perhaps because of the importance of mining and ranching in those states. 
Australia’s Indigenous population are extremely disadvantaged socio-economically, 
so it is important to control for their share of the population. Unfortunately, the size of the 
Indigenous population was measured with error, especially for the first half of the twentieth 
century. This measurement problem is probably not too serious for most states because 
Indigenous Australians were likely to have been less than five per cent of the population  
even during the first half of the twentieth century. However, in the Northern Territory, the 
Indigenous share of population was likely to have been far greater than the rest of Australia. 
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So, the problem of counting the Indigenous population is yet another reason for excluding the 
Northern Territory from the analysis.  
Prior to 1967, the Australia constitution explicitly prohibited Indigenous Australians 
being enumerated in the Census. Pre-1967 period, Smith’s (1980) estimates of the size of the 
Indigenous population are used. Even after the successful referendum to change the 
constitution, it is likely that the authorities took some time to accurately count the Indigenous 
population given that many of them live in isolated places. Also, people might have changed 
their attitudes to identifying as Indigenous Australians. So, even the Census data collected 
after the 1967 referendum might not accurately record the number of Indigenous Australians. 
Figure 2b shows the indigenous share of the overall population in each state based on the 
ABS estimates. The share of the population in Queensland and Western Australia is much 
higher than in other states, but Indigenous Australians are still a small minority in these 
states. Only one of the people executed after 1910 was an Indigenous Australian.6 
 Whether people live in cities or the countryside might affect the homicide rate. The 
opportunities for crime, in particular violent crime, are greater in urban areas where people 
live in close proximity. On the other hand, licensed weapons might be easier to obtain in rural 
areas where weapons are used on farms. Thus, it is important to control for the level of 
urbanisation when modelling murder rates. Figure2c shows the proportion of Australians 
living in rural areas. At the start of the twentieth century, Australia was a country where 
nearly half the population lived in the countryside. Currently, nearly 90% of Australian live 
in urban areas, a percentage that is higher than the average urbanisation rate of high income 
countries.7  
                                                          




 Immigration might create social unrest and perhaps violence, either between native 
born and immigrants, or within the immigrant community if that community is difficult to 
police due to language and cultural differences, etc. Figure 2d shows the percentage of 
foreign born people in each state. During the first half of the twentieth century, there was a 
gradual decline in the percentage of foreign born Australians, but this was followed by an 
influx of immigrants after the Second World War. Tasmania has always had the fewest 
immigrants; Western Australia has always had the largest number of foreign born.   
 Economic conditions might affect the level of homicide. For example, if the economy 
is doing well, then the demand for alcohol and illegal drugs might increase and, with it, the 
associated level of violence. On the other hand, unemployment might increase the incentives 
for property crime which might result in increased levels of violent crime. Figure 2e shows 
the percentage of unemployed (men) based on interpolations from the census. Unfortunately, 
more frequently recorded data is unavailable before the Second World War.  
 Figure 2f and 2e show the marriage and divorce rates. A large proportion of 
homicides are related to domestic violence, so one should control for the level of family 
stability. The rate of new marriages peaked during the Second World War; perhaps couples 
brought forward their marriage because they feared they might not survive the war. Since 
then, fewer people have married. In relation to divorce rates, it is notable that divorce law 
changed in the late 1970s to make it easier to divorce.  
 The level of mental illness is important to control for when modelling the 
determinants of homicide rates. A proxy variable might be the suicide rate. Figure 2g shows 
the suicide rate by state over the period. The states followed a similar trend although Western 
Australia has generally had a higher suicide rate. Suicides peaked during the Depression, fell 
during the Second World War and have been trending upwards since then.  
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The likelihood of a potential murderer being apprehended is proxied by state-year 
number of police officers per capita and the number of prisoners per capita. It could be 
argued that police and prisoner numbers are correlated with homicide rates and the death 
penalty. Perhaps, states that took a tough position in relation to fighting crime also took a 
tough line when it came to punishing crime. Or perhaps, states that removed the death 
penalty, instead put more resources into their police and prisons.  In Figure 2h and 2i show 
that the levels of policing and incarceration have been very similar across the states.  
Unfortunately, there is no historical data relating to the availability of guns. The first 
study of gun ownership in Australia was Harding (1981). The first legislation to control gun 
ownership was introduced between the World Wars. The first legislation controlled 
concealable short barrel guns. The states introduced legislation around the same time: New 
South Wales in 1920, 1927 and 1936; Victoria in 1921, 1928 and 1932; Queensland in 1927 
and 1933; South Australia in 1917, 1919 and 1929; Western Australia in 1931 and 1939; and 
Tasmania in 1932. Only Western Australia had strict licensing and registration of long-barrel 
guns (from 1931). The Port Arthur Massacre of 1996 was catalyst for the national “Gun Buy 
Back” Policy. 600,000 guns were destroyed, semi-automatic and pump-action weapons were 
banned, and National Firearms Legislation was implemented across all states and territories. 
Because the gun control legislation was introduced around the same time in the states, the 







Tables 3 and Table 4 display the OLS estimates of the effect of executions and the abolition 
of the death penalty on the homicide rate. Column (1) shows the estimates of the following 
equation: 
(1) Homicide Rateit = αi + λDecadet + βDeath Penalty Variableit+ εit 
where state “i" is one of the six states and year “t” spans from 1910 to 2010. In 
Column (2) linear state-specific time trends were added to the model. In Column (3) 
observable year- and state-varying factors were added to the model. The estimates of the state 
fixed effects, the decade fixed effects, and state specific time trends are omitted from the 
tables for the sake of brevity but were included in the models. Different lag lengths for the 
demographic, justice system and death penalty variables yield similar results to those found 
in Table 3 and Table 4. Removing states from the analysis does not alter the conclusion of the 
analysis. 
This study follows a difference-in-difference design using variation in policy by state 
and year. Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan (2004) demonstrated the need to account for 
within-state dependence when carrying out statistical inference with difference-in-difference 
studies.  In this study, the p-value for each coefficient was generated using the 
CGMWILDBOOT8 command which implements the Wild Cluster Bootstrap-t procedure 
introduced by Cameron, Gelbach and Miller (2008).9 
In the first row of Table 3, we can see that an execution taking place in the previous 
year had a negative effect on homicide rates in the following year. The coefficient is very 
similar across the specifications.  An execution reduces the homicide rate by between 0.15 
and 0.2 per 100k people. One interpretation of the coefficients is that each execution saved 
                                                          
8 The command was written by Judson Caskey. To download the command, access: 
https://sites.google.com/site/judsoncaskey/data 
9 Cameron, Gelbach and Miller (2008 425) note that “Using the wild cluster bootstrap method, our empirical 
rejection rates are extremely close to the theoretical values, even with as few as six clusters, and there is no 
noticeable loss of power after accounting for size.” 
15 
 
around twenty lives given that the average population in Australia was around 11 million 
between 1910 and 2010. Crucially, however, the p-values for the null hypothesis of no 
deterrent effect are around 20%, so there was no statistically significant effect of executions 
on the homicide rate. On the other hand, the marriage rate is found to have a significant and 
negative effect on homicide. Suicides have a significantly positive effect on homicide.  
In Table 4, the effect of abolition on homicide rates is presented. The coefficient is 
always positive, but it varies from specification to specification. When controlling for just 
state fixed effects and decade fixed effects, abolition raises the homicide rate by 0.11 
homicides per 100k head of population. The coefficient is statistically significant at the 10% 
level. Adding a linear state specific time trend causes the abolition coefficient to nearly 
double: abolition is associated with a 0.2 unit increase in the homicide rate. However, when 
year- and state-varying factors are added, the coefficient falls back to around 0.107, and the 
effect is no longer statistically significant. As was the case in table 3: the marriage rate has a 
negative effect on homicides, and the suicide rate has a positive effect on homicides.  
 
 
Endogeneity of Executions 
 Perhaps the observed correlation between homicides and capital punishment in some 
of the research literature is not a causal relationship but rather reflects general attitudes 
towards violence in society which affect both homicides and executions. For example, an 
“eye for eye” attitude might prevail in society. Places that have the death penalty might also 
have other policies that are tough on crime.  
In this paper, the number of police and prisoners were included in the models. Also, 
the non-capital sanctions for murder did not appear to have varied much between states (as 
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will be discussed below). However, perhaps there still could be an unobserved “toughness on 
crime” factor that is correlated with use of the death penalty.  
Additionally, perhaps feedback between homicide rates and executions might affect 
the estimates. A rise in murders, or crime in general, might result in juries convicting more 
often or perhaps state governments would be less likely to exercise their prerogative of 
mercy. Thus, one might underestimate the deterrent effect of executions.  
In Australia, a death sentence was mandatory for murder. The prerogative of mercy 
rested with the Executive Council (the government) of each state, not with the jury or judge. 
The Executive Council of each state decided who would hang. Each Australian state is a 
parliamentary democracy with a Premier who commands the support of the state’s lower 
house of parliament, known as the Legislative Assembly, who leads an Executive Council to 
govern the state.  Figures 3a-3f shows the relationship between the death penalty and the 
politics in each state. The blue series shows the percentage of seats held by the Australian 
Labor Party in the Legislative Assembly. The Australian Labor Party were generally anti-
death penalty, but the party did oversee some executions. The centre right parties (the Liberal 
Party and its predecessors, the United Australia Party and the Nationalist Party) were in 
favour of retaining the death penalty, but commuted sentences quite often. The smaller, rural-
based County Party (now known as the National Party) was in favour of the death penalty and 
they were often in coalition governments with the Liberals. Jones (1968) gives an account of 
the role of politics in the use of the death penalty in each state.  
 Whether the Australian Labor Party were in government was used as an Instrumental 
Variable to provide exogenous variation in the use of the death penalty. Data about 
Australian elections were obtained from http://elections.uwa.edu.au/.  
It could be argued that support for the Australian Labor Party could depend on crime 
levels, and homicide in particular, given the ALP’s position on the death penalty. And the 
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ALP’s policies could also affect crime and homicides in ways not captured by the other 
variables in the model (such as the number of police and prisoners). So, the validity of using 
ALP support as an Instrumental Variable for executions depends on the extent to which 
people vote for parties because of their position on the death penalty and the extent to which 
the ALP’s effect on homicides is not captured by the other variables in the model. One also 
must keep in mind that, unlike certain parts of the United States, Australian police officials, 
judges and prosecutors were, and are, unelected; so support for a political party would not 
have the same direct effect on the criminal justice system as it might in the USA. 
Endogeneity of Abolition 
 The abolition of the death penalty might also be endogenous. Suppose some 
unobserved factor caused murders to rise. Governments might have chosen to retain the death 
penalty because they felt it would deter crime. On the other hand, suppose some unobserved 
factor caused murder rates to fall, then states might have abolished the death penalty because 
they thought it was no longer needed. If murder rates then rose back to their previous levels, 
one might conclude that the abolition of the death penalty caused the rise in murders.  
To capture exogenous variation in the abolition of the death penalty, Australian Labor 
Party representation in the upper houses, known as the Legislative Councils, of each state 
parliament was used as an instrumental variable.10 While Executive Councils (state 
governments) could exercise the prerogative of mercy in specific cases, the support of both 
houses of parliament was needed to abolish the death penalty generally. Abolition of the 
death penalty did not happen sooner in Australia because often legislation failed to pass the 
Legislative Councils.  
                                                          
10 As will be discussed below, Queensland became unicameral after 1921. So in the case of 
Queensland, ALP representation in the single chamber parliament of Queensland was coded 
as the instrumental variable from 1922 onwards.  
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Australian Labor Party Executive Councils, who had the support of their respective 
popularly elected Legislative Assemblies, regularly faced Legislative Councils which voted 
down their bills including abolition of the death penalty. Even when (conservative) Liberal 
Governments ran the state government, they were often opposed by their own members in the 
Legislative Councils.  
Furthermore, ALP support in the Legislative Council was also necessary to ensure 
that the death penalty was not re-instated. The death penalty has rarely been re-introduced, 
except in times of war, in democratic countries, but it could have happened. Two examples 
are the United States which reinstated the death penalty in the late 1970s after a brief hiatus 
and, perhaps most relevant to this paper, New Zealand which abolished the death penalty in 
1941, reinstated it in 1950 and abolished it again in 1961.  
State governments faced an uncooperative Legislative Council because the members 
of the Legislative Councils had terms of office that were longer than that of the Legislative 
Assembly. Also, by design, the election cycles of the Councils were often asynchronous to 
the Assemblies’. For a long time, members of the Councils enjoyed considerable security in 
their positions. In the three mainland Councils with popular election, the percentage of 
uncontested seats at elections in the years 1930–50 were as follows: Victoria 47%; Western 
Australia 33%; South Australia 26% (Hughes and Aitkin 1986). In Tasmania, between 1947 
and 1993, in just over one fifth of Council elections, the incumbent was returned unopposed 
(Fewkes, 2011).  
Furthermore, the electoral systems for the Legislative Councils led to, the generally 
anti-death penalty, ALP being under-represented relative to its popular support. So, even if 
voters supported the Australian Labor Party because of it usually opposed the death penalty, 
the ALP’s ability to abolish the death penalty depended on at least some Councillors from 
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other parties voting against their own parties’ position, and on electoral reforms that 
increased ALP representation in the Councils.  
Table 5 shows the major reforms of each state’s Legislative Council. Property-based 
franchises excluded voters who did not own their homes and, in the case of Western 
Australia, allowed for plural voting for those owning more than one property. This voting 
system disadvantaged the ALP because one of its main bases of support was poorer urban 
voters. Aside from property-based franchises, the electoral apportionment system of the 
Councils favoured rural voters, who were more likely to support the socially conservative 
Country Party. During the second half of the twentieth century, states began to use the 
Proportional Representation Single Transferable Vote and state-wide “At Large” voting 
districts, and moved away from single member seats that inflated the value of rural votes. 
These reforms have greatly increased the representation of the ALP in the Legislative 
Councils. However, the reforms took time to come about because the reforms had to be 
approved by the existing Legislative Councils who had every incentive to maintain the status 
quo. The final column of Table 5 lists some of the failed attempts to reform the Legislative 
Councils.  
  
Chronological Account of the Abolition of the Death Penalty by State 
Lennan and Williams (2012) provide an account of the abolition of the death penalty 
in each Australian state.11 In Queensland, the first attempt at abolition of the death penalty 
was defeated in the Legislative Council in 1916 (Barber, 1968). Members of Queensland’s 
Council were appointed for life by the Governor on advice of the Premier. The ALP who 
controlled the Legislative Assembly became frustrated by the Legislative Council blocking 
                                                          




their general political agenda (and not just the abolition of the death penalty). The ALP were 
defeated in a referendum to abolish the Legislative Council in 1917. The ALP then convinced 
the Governor (the unelected representative of the Crown) to appoint more ALP members to 
the Council. Having been packed with ALP members, in 1921 the Queensland Legislative 
Council voted itself out of existence. In 1922, the abolition of the death penalty passed the 
new unicameral Queensland parliament by a vote of 33-30 (the ALP had 38 seats at the time). 
A detailed account of the abolition of the death penalty in New South Wales is given 
by Curby (2017). Initially, in the case of New South Wales, the membership of the 
Legislative Council was appointed by the Governor with advice from the Premier. The ALP 
tried to reform the Council multiple times during the 1920s and early 1930s. The ALP in 
New South Wales attempted the same ploy as their colleagues in Queensland. The New 
South Wales ALP convinced the Governor to appoint enough of their members to the Council 
so that they could vote the Council out of existence. However, the scheme failed in 1926 
when some of the appointees defied party orders and voted to save the Council.  
At the start of the 1930s, the ALP had a majority in both houses of parliament. 
Perhaps the death penalty would have been abolished in the 1930s had the then Governor of 
New South Wales not dismissed the ALP Premier because of a debt crisis. The next 
administration, a conservative ministry, reformed the Council so that half of the Council 
would be elected by the Assembly and by the other half of the Council. Thus, both the 
Assembly and Council would reflect the support of the parties. By 1953, the ALP had a 
majority of members in both houses; abolition of the death penalty for murder followed in 
1955.  
The Tasmanian parliament voted by a majority of just one to retain the death penalty 
in 1924. Ostensibly, independent non-party politicians have always had a large majority on 
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the Tasmanian Council. However, many of the independents were previously members of the 
(conservative) Liberal Party which usually did not field candidates for the Council. The ALP 
often had between one and five seats on the Council. Initially, Tasmania had a property-based 
franchise for Council elections. But universal franchise was introduced in 1968. Bills to 
abolish the death penalty failed twelve times in the Legislative Council before finally 
succeeding in 1968.  
In South Australia, an attempt at abolition of the death penalty failed in the 
Legislative Council in 1971. Only property owners could vote for the South Australian 
Council until 1975. Furthermore, the boundaries of the voting districts disadvantaged the 
ALP because it drew its support from urban areas in and around Adelaide. But in 1975, the 
elections to the Council were held under universal franchise using a single at-large voting 
district under PRSTV. At the same time, the (conservative) Liberal-Country League split.  As 
a result, the ALP greatly increased its representation in the Council. After the 1975 election, 
the ALP had a plurality of seats in both houses. In 1976, abolition of the death penalty passed 
after the Council’s recommendation of keeping the death penalty for certain types of murders 
was ignored.  
Except for a few months in 1985, the ALP did not have a majority on the Victoria 
Council until the 21st century. The property franchise was abolished in 1950, but the main 
disadvantage for the ALP was that their support was clustered around Melbourne, and the 
voting system elected members from single member districts that were malapportioned to 
favour rural areas (until some reform in 2005).  In 1929, an attempt to abolish the death 
penalty failed in the Legislative Council by a vote of 14-4. In 1967, the execution of a 
prisoner who had murdered a prison guard during an escape galvanised opposition to the 
death penalty; it was Victoria’s first execution in over fifteen years. It turned out to be 
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Victoria’s and Australia’s last execution. A bill to abolish the death penalty passed the 
Legislative Council on a free vote by 20 to 13 (The ALP held ten seats at the time).  
Western Australia was the last state to abolish the death penalty, arguably because the 
local ALP was less abolitionist than in other states – ALP governments sanctioned some 
executions before the Second World War. In Western Australia until 1965, only property 
owners could vote, and those who owned more than one property could vote more than once 
in Legislative Council elections. Urban and rural areas continue to have equal representation 
despite the overwhelming majority of the population residing in the city of Perth. This voting 
system disadvantages the ALP, and gave an advantage to the then pro-death penalty Country 
Party (now known as the National Party) whose share of the seats in the Western Australian 
Council was often twice as large as their share of the votes. By the 1980s, Western Australia 
was the only state to still have the death penalty for murder. The Western Australian Council 
eventually abolished the death penalty in 1984 by a vote of 17-12.  
 
 
Instrumental Variable Estimates 
Table 6 shows the IV estimates of the effect of executions and abolition of the death 
penalty on homicides. The estimated first stage equations are also shown. An ALP premier 
being in power in a state in a given year has a negative effect on whether an execution took 
place. The F-statistic of the instrumental variable was 45.78. The effect of an execution on 
homicide was negative (and larger in absolute terms than the OLS estimate) but is not 
statistically significant in the second stage.  
The percentage of Legislative Council held by the ALP had a positive effect on 
abolition of the death penalty for murder. In this equation, the F-statistic of the instrumental 
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variable was 11.25. In the second stage equation, the coefficient of the abolition variable is 
positive but not statistically significant.  
Currently, STATA programs that implement the Wild Cluster Bootstrap-t procedure 
do not allow for IV estimation. So, the regular cluster-robust standard errors are shown in 
Table 6. These standard errors are likely to be too small. However, given that we do not find 
a statistically significant effect of capital punishment when the standard errors are too small, 
we would not find an effect if, the presumably larger, correct standard errors could be 
estimated.  
Non-Capital Sanctions 
The National Research Council (2012) criticised the lack of research about sanction regimes. 
Capital and non-capital sanctions might be correlated. For example, states that are tough on 
crime might have both the death penalty and lengthy sentences for killers who are not 
executed. Thus, a finding in the literature that the death penalty has a deterrent effect might at 
least partially reflect a general tough policy against crime that deters potential criminals. On 
the other hand, states that abolish the death penalty, might replace capital punishment with 
long prison sentences as a close substitute.   
In Australia, the death penalty was the mandatory sentence for murder. Each state 
government considered the context of each conviction when deciding whether to commute 
the death sentence. Death sentences were usually commuted to life sentences or to fixed-year 
sentences. Despite its title, a life sentence did not usually mean the prisoner would die in 
prison. According to Freiberg and Biles (1975), between 1900 and 1974, about 81% prisoners 
who had their sentences commuted were eventually released on parole or deported. The 
percentage of prisoners who were eventually released ranged from 76% in Queensland to 
95% in South Australia. Although there was variation in the percentage of prisoners released 
across states, it is clear that the majority of life sentence prisoners in all states could expect to 
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be released at some point before they died, and there was no statistical difference in the 
percentage of prisoners who died in prison between states that abolished the death penalty 
earlier (Queensland and New South Wales) and states that abolished the death penalty later.   
Every state eventually introduced a mandatory life sentence for murder when the 
death penalty was abolished. Table 7 shows the average length of sentences served by 
prisoners who served life sentences and commuted death sentences based on Potas (1989) 
and Freiberg A. & Biles D. 1975. The data are incomplete, but it appears there was not a 
systematic difference between states in terms of the length of sentence served by those 
released from prison (except in Tasmania where the average term served does appear to have 
been shorter) and whether the state abolished the death earlier or later.  
 More recent data about sentences served by releasees are unavailable. However, since 
those data were collected, sentences for murder, and most probably the length of sentence 
actually served, are longer than they used to be in all states. (see Anderson (2012) for a 
discussion). In the models presented in Table 3 & 4, the dummy variables that control for the 
decade will to some extent pick up trends in sentencing that are common to all Australian 
states. However, Table A1 and Table A2 in the Appendix present the results omitting the 
1990s and 2000s from the analysis because there is no data about sentences served by recent 
releasees.  The results are very similar to those in Table 3 and Table 4.  
 
CONCLUSION 
Overall, the analysis did not reveal much evidence that the death penalty reduces homicides. 
Simple time series plots of homicide rates against executions and the abolition of the death 
penalty suggested that trends in homicides were similar across states despite different capital 
punishment regimes being in place.  
The OLS estimates of the effect of executions on the following year’s homicide rate 
were negative but not statistically significant. Under IV, using whether the Australian Labor 
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Party were in power as an instrumental variable, the effect of executions was also not 
statistically significant. The validity of the instrument depends on the extent to which voters 
supported the ALP because of its position on the death penalty and whether the ALP being in 
power affected homicide rates beyond their effect on police and prison numbers.  
Using OLS, death penalty laws were statistically significant when controlling for 
state- and decade-fixed effects and state-specific linear time trends. However, the effect of 
death penalty laws was no longer statistically significant once demographic and criminal 
justice factors were been controlled for. Using ALP support in the state Legislative Councils, 
which depended on electoral reforms, as an instrumental variable, the effect of the abolition 
of the death penalty was not statistically significant.  
This study suggests that the death penalty did not deter murderers in Australia. 
Furthermore, policy makers considering this evidence also need be mindful that at least one 
execution in the dataset was the result of a wrongful conviction. In 2008, Colin Campbell 
Ross was posthumously pardoned for the murder of Nell Alma Tirtschke for which he was 
hanged in 1922. He was pardoned on the basis of DNA evidence. Given advances in 
forensics and technology, one might believe that wrongful executions are less likely today; 




Anderson, John. 2012. “The Label of Life Imprisonment in Australia: A Principled or 
Populist Approach to an Ultimate Sentence.” University of New South Wales Law Journal 
Volume 35(3): 747-778. 
 
Avio, Kenneth L. 1979. “Capital Punishment in Canada: A Time-Series Analysis of the 
Deterrent Hypothesis.” Canadian Journal of Economics 12: 647–676. 
 
Barber, R.N. 1968. “The Labor Party and the Abolition of Capital Punishment in Queensland 




Barber, R. N., and P. R. Wilson. 1968. “'Deterrent Aspects of Capital Punishment and its 
Effect on Conviction Rates: The Queensland Experience.” Australia New Zealand Journal of 
Criminology, 100. 
 
Bertrand, M., E. Duflo, and S. Mullainathan, “How Much Should We Trust Differences-in-
Differences Estimates?” Quarterly Journal of Economics 119 (2004), 249–275. 
 
Cameron Colin, Jonah B. Gelbach, and Douglas L. Miller (2008). “Bootstrap-Based 
Improvements For Inference With Clustered Errors” Review of Economics and Statistics, 
90(3): 414–427. 
 
Clifford, W. 1979. Suicide in Western Australia Canberra, Australia: Australian Institute of 
Criminology. 
 
Curby, Pauline. 2017. “Cold-blooded Judicial Murder 1910-1925.” Journal of Royal 
Australian Historical Society, Vol. 103 Part 1.  
 
Dezhbakhsh, Hashem, Rubin, Paul, and Shepherd, Joanna. 2003. “Does Capital Punishment 
Have a Deterrent Effect? New Evidence from Postmoratorium Panel Data.” American Law 
and Economics Review, 5(2), 344-376. 
 
Dezhbakhsh, Hashem, and Paul Rubin 2011. “From The ‘Econometrics of Capital 
Punishment’ to the ‘Capital Punishment’ Of Econometrics.” Applied Economics 43 (25), pp. 
3655 – 3670. 
 
Donohue John J. and Justin Wolfers 2005. “Uses and Abuses of Empirical Evidence in the 
Death Penalty Debate” Stanford Law Review, 58, 791–845. 
 
Donohue, John and Justin Wolfers. 2009. “Estimating the Impact of the Death Penalty on 
Murder” American Law and Economics Review V11 N2 pp249–309.  
 
Ehrlich Isaac. 1975. “The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: A Question of Life and 
Death” The American Economic Review, Vol. 65, No. 3. pp. 397-417. 
 
Fewkes, Nathan. 2011. “Tasmania’s Legislative Council elections: Is Reform Needed?” 
Australasian Parliamentary Review, Vol. 26(2), pp. 87–98. 
 
Freiberg A. & Biles D. 1975. The Meaning of ‘Life’: A Study of Life Sentences in Australia, 
Australian Institute of Criminology, Canberra. 
 
Jones, Barry. (ed) 1968. The Penalty is Death: Capital Punishment in the Twentieth Century. 
Melbourne, Australia: Sun Books. 
 
Harding, R.W. 1981. Firearms and Violence in Australian Life. University of Western 
Australia Press, Nedlands. 
 
Katz, Lawrence, Steven D. Levitt, and Ellen Shustorovich. 2003. “Prison Conditions, Capital 




Layson, Stephen. 1983. “Homicide and Deterrence: Another View of the Canadian Time 




Jo, and George Williams. 2012. “The Death Penalty in Australian Law.” Sydney Law 
Review,  Vol 34, pp.659-94. 
 
MacDonald, Arthur. 1910. “Death Penalty and Homicide.” American Journal of Sociology, 
Vol. 16, No. 1, pp. 88-116. 
 
Mocan, Naci and R. Kaj Gittings. 2003. “Getting off Death Row: Commuted Sentences and 
the Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment.” Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 46, No. 2, 
pp. 453-478.  
 
Mocan, H.N., and Gittings, R.K. 2010. The impact of incentives on human behavior: Can we 
make it disappear? The case of the death penalty. In R.E.S. Di Tella and E. Schargrodsky 
(Eds.), The Economics of Crime: Lessons for and from Latin America (pp. 379- 
420). National Bureau of Economic Research conference report. Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press. 
 
Mukherjee, Satyanshu K., Evelyn N. Jacobsen, and John R. Walker. 1981. Source Book of 
Australian Criminal and Social Statistics 1900 -1980. Canberra, Australia: Australian 
Institute of Criminology 
 
National Research Council. 2012. Deterrence and the Death Penalty. Committee on 
Deterrence and the Death Penalty, Daniel S. Nagin and John V. Pepper, Eds. Committee on 
Law and Justice, Division of Behavioral and Social Sciences and Education. Washington, 
DC: The National Academies Press. 
 
Potas, Ivan. 1989.  “Life Imprisonment in Australia” Australian Institute of Criminology, 
Canberra Australia. Trends & Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice Number 19.  
 
Smith, L.R. 1980. The Aboriginal Population of Australia, Canberra, Australia: Australian 
National University Press. 
 
Vamplew, Wray ed. 1981. Australians Historical Statistics Broadway, N.S.W., Australia: 
Fairfax, Syme and Weldon Associates. 
 
Wolpin, Kenneth I.  1978. “Capital Punishment and Homicide in England: A Summary of 
Results.” The American Economic Review, Vol. 68, No. 2, Papers and Proceedings of the 
Ninetieth Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association, pp. 422-427. 
 
Zimmerman, P.R. 2004. “State Executions, Deterrence, and the Incidence of Murder.” 
Journal of Applied Economics, 7(1), 163-193. 
 
Zimmermann, Paul R. 2009. “Statistical Variability and the Deterrent Effect of Death 
Penalty.” American Law and Economics Review 11, pp. 370 – 398. 
 
Zimring, Franklin E., Jeffrey Fagan, and David T. Johnson. 2010. “Executions, Deterrence, 







Table 1: State aggregates 1910-2010 
 New 
South 





Year of final execution 1940 1967 1913 1964 1964 1946 
Year of abolition 1955 1975 1922 1976 1984 1968 
Number of executions 12 17 3 15 19 5 
Average annual homicide rate 1.6 1.6 1.36 1.37 1.27 1.6 
Change in homicide rate five years after/before 
abolition 
 
0.48 -0.178 -0.026 0.551 0.072 0.911 
Five-year difference in difference  
of homicide rate relative to retentionist states 















Table 2: List of variables and sources 
Variable Years Source 
Estimate of annual population of each state 1910-2010 Australian Bureau of Statistics, 3105.0.65.001 Australian Historical Population Statistics, 
2014. Table 1.1 
Homicide rate per 100,000 persons 1910-1963 State Year Books 
 1963 No data 
 1964-2010 Australian Institute for Health and Welfare 
Execution data 1910-2010 State Year Books 
Men aged 20-29 as percentage of 
population 
1910-2010 Australian Bureau of Statistics 3105.0.65.001 Australian Historical Population Statistics, 
2014 
 
Indigenous Australians as a percent of 
population 
1910-1966 Smith (1981) for the same dates as Census, interpolated for intervening years 
 1967-2010 Five-year Census (starting from 1971) interpolated for intervening years 
Percent living in rural areas 1910-2010 Censuses of 1901, 1911, 1921, 1933, 1947, 1954, 1961 and then every five years 
Interpolated for intervening years 
Percent foreign born 1910-2010 As above. 
Suicides per 100k 1910-1963 State Year Books 
 1963-1977 Clifford (1979) 
 1978 Interpolated 
 1979-1992 ABS Catalogue Number 33090 Suicides 1921-1998 Table 10 
 1992-2002 ABS Catalogue Number 3309.0.55.001 Suicides: Recent Trends, Australia. Table 6 
 2001-2010 Australian Bureau of Statistics 3303.0 Causes of Death, Australia, 2010. Table 11.5 
Marriages per 100k & Divorces per 100k 1900-1979 Mukherjee et al (1981) 
 1980-1982 Vamplew (1989) 
 1983-1987 Interpolated 
 1988-2010 Yearbook Australia 
Prisoners per capita, Police Officers per 
capita 





Table 3: OLS estimates of effect of lagged values on homicide rate 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Executions -0.155 -0.174 -0.193 
 [0.205] [0.198] [0.183] 
Young males   0.116 
   [0.243] 
Indigenous   -0.053 
   [0.647] 
Foreign born    0.007 
   [0.914] 
Rural dweller   0.009 
   [0.8] 
Unemployment    0.015 
   [0.248] 
Police per 100k   0.000 
   [0.948] 
Prisoners per 100k   -0.001 
   [0.326] 
Marriages per 100k   -0.001 
   [0.012]** 
Divorces per 100k   0.000 
   [0.471] 
Suicides per 100k   0.041 
   [0.042]** 
(1) State fixed effects and indicator variables for each decade 
(2) as in (1) with linear state-specific trends 
(3) as in (2) with year-state varying observable factors 
*, ** and *** significant at 10%, 5% and at 1% level. 
All variables are lagged by one year. 
Observations are weighted by state-year population. 














Table 4: OLS estimates of effect of lagged values on homicide rate 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Abolition 0.110 0.204 0.107 
 [0.095]* [0.009]*** [0.219] 
Young males   0.124 
   [0.233] 
Indigenous   -0.063 
   [0.51] 
Foreign born    0.002 
   [0.939] 
Rural dweller   0.009 
   [0.676] 
Unemployment    0.016 
   [0.21] 
Police per 100k   -0.001 
   [0.743] 
Prisoners per 100k   -0.001 
   [0.493] 
Marriages per 100k   -0.001 
   [0.011]** 
Divorces per 100k   0.000 
   [0.427] 
Suicides per 100k   0.036 
   [0.074]* 
(1) State fixed effects and indicator variables for each decade 
(2) as in (1) with linear state-specific trends 
(3) as in (2) with year-state varying observable factors 
*, ** and *** significant at 10%, 5% and at 1% level. 
Observations are weighted by state-year population. 
All variables are lagged by one year. 






















Table 5: Characteristics of legislative council 
 Elected? Removal 
of property 
franchise 
Rural malapportionment reform Failed constitutional & electoral reforms 
New South Wales     
until 1934 Life-time appointees by 
Governor General 
n/a n/a Abolition of Council fails in 44-43 vote 
in 1926 
1934-1978 Indirect election by 
Assembly and Council 
n/a n/a Reform bill for direct election defeated in 
1943 
Abolition of Council bill defeated 30-29 
in 1946 
Abolition of Council referendum 
defeated in 1961 
Since 1978 Direct elections n/a At-large district & PRSTV since 1978  
     
Victoria Direct elections 1950 Multi-seat PRSTV since 2006 1959, 1976, 1977 failed Bills to abolish 
Council 
     
Queensland              
(until 1922) 
Life-time appointees by 
Governor 
n/a n/a Abolition of Council referendum 
defeated in 1917 
     
South Australia Direct elections 1975 At-large district & PRSTV since 1975 Bill to reduce rural malapportionment 
and introduce universal suffrage defeated 
in 1966 
     
Western Australia Direct elections 1965 PRSTV since 1989 but 
malapportionment continues 
1919 Bill to grant vote to ex-servicemen 
fails. 1978 Bill for PR does not proceed.  
     






Table 6: IV estimates of effect of lagged values on homicide rate 
 (1) (2) 
 1st Stage 2nd Stage 1st Stage 2nd Stage 
Any Executions  -0.571   
  (0.631)   
Abolition     -0.213 
    (0.364) 
ALP Premier -0.082***    
 (0.012)    
%ALP Seats in Council    0.007***  
   (0.001)  
Young Male 0.011 0.118* 0.054 0.131* 
 (0.057) (0.071) (0.052) (0.079) 
Indigenous 0.066* -0.026 -0.047 -0.078 
 (0.033) (0.107) (0.118) (0.119) 
Foreign Born -0.002 0.008 0.038*** 0.014 
 (0.007) (0.013) (0.007) (0.023) 
Rural Dweller 0.006 0.010 -0.025 0.003 
 (0.008) (0.019) (0.024) (0.028) 
Unemployment  0.007 0.018* -0.015** 0.010 
 (0.005) (0.011) (0.006) (0.006) 
Police per 100k -0.000 -0.000 0.005** 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Prisoners per 100k -0.000 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Marriages per 100k 0.000 -0.001** -0.001*** -0.001** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Divorces per 100k -0.000 -0.000* 0.001 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Suicides per 100k 0.004 0.042*** 0.036** 0.048*** 
 (0.005) (0.010) (0.011) (0.009) 
Models include state fixed effects, indicator variables for decades, and state-specific linear 
time trend. 
*, ** and *** significant at 10%, 5% and at 1% level. 
Observations are weighted by state-year population. 
All variables are lagged by one year. 










Table 7: Non-Capital Sanctions of Commuted and Life-Sentence Prisoners 
 Year Percentage Released 
or Deported 
Average Duration Notes 
New South Wales 1932-1974 80 13 years 6 months Term Served (Males) 
 1975-1979  14 years 3 months Term Served 
 1984-1987  11 years 7 months Term Served 
Victoria 1928-1974 89 13 years 9 months Term Served (Males) 
 1986-1987  14 years 3 months Minimum Sentence 
Queensland 1900-1974 76 12 years 11 months Term Served (Males) 
 1959-1988  15 years 9 months Term Served 
South Australia 1918-1974 94 11 years Term Served (Males) 
 1983-1988  13 years 3 months Minimum Sentence (with remission) 
Western Australia 1918-1974 81 12 years 11 months Term Served (Males) 
 1975-1988  13 years 11 months Term Served 
Tasmania 1951-1974 83   
 1946-1988  10 years 3 months Term Served 
Sources:  
Potas, Ivan. 1989.  “Life Imprisonment in Australia” Australian Institute of Criminology, Canberra Australia. Trends & Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice Number 19.  






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix Table A1: OLS estimates of effect of lagged values on homicide rate, pre-
1990 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Executions -0.152 -0.183 -0.181 
 [0.235] [0.189] [0.112] 
Young males   0.010 
   [0.974] 
Indigenous   -0.096 
   [0.188] 
Foreign born    -0.017 
   [0.14] 
Rural dweller   0.024 
   [0.424] 
Unemployment    -0.006 
   [0.624] 
Police per 100k   0.004 
   [0.118] 
Prisoners per 100k   -0.001 
   [0.482] 
Marriages per 100k   -0.001 
   [0.002]*** 
Divorces per 100k   -0.001 
   [0.326] 
Suicides per 100k   0.029 
   [0.082]* 
(1) State fixed effects and indicator variables for each decade 
(2) as in (1) with linear state-specific trends 
(3) as in (2) with year-state varying observable factors 
*, ** and *** significant at 10%, 5% and at 1% level. 
Observations are weighted by state-year population. 
All variables are lagged by one year. 














Appendix Table A2: OLS estimates of effect of variable on homicide rate OLS 
estimates of effect of lagged values on homicide rate, pre-1990 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Abolition 0.116 0.157 0.108 
 [0.208] [0.015]** [0.309] 
Young males   -0.003 
   [0.892] 
Indigenous   -0.093 
   [0.314] 
Foreign born    -0.022 
   [0.002]*** 
Rural dweller   0.026 
   [0.406] 
Unemployment    -0.008 
   [0.484] 
Police per 100k   0.003 
   [0.276] 
Prisoners per 100k   0.000 
   [0.999] 
Marriages per 100k   -0.001 
   [0.018]* 
Divorces per 100k   -0.001 
   [0.062]* 
Suicides per 100k   0.023 
   [0.201] 
(1) State fixed effects and indicator variables for each decade 
(2) as in (1) with linear state-specific trends 
(3) as in (2) with year-state varying observable factors 
*, ** and *** significant at 10%, 5% and at 1% level. 
Observations are weighted by state-year population. 
All variables are lagged by one year. 
p-values derived from Wild-Cluster Bootstrap in parenthesis. 
 
 
 
 
